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Der Zugang der Entwicklungsländer zu den Errungen-
schaften des medizinischen Fortschritts ist vielfach defi-
zitär. Besondere Probleme bereitet dabei der Zugang zu 
patentgeschützten Arzneimitteln. Das Spannungsver-
hältnis zwischen den internationalen Regeln des Patent-
schutzes einerseits und den pharmazeutischen Bedürf-
nissen der Entwicklungsländer andererseits ist das The-
ma des Beitrags von Holzer. Schwerpunkt ist die 
Auseinandersetzung mit den rechtspolitischen Vorschlä-
gen zur Lösung der Problematik. OdW ist für Diskussi-
onsbeiträge zu diesem wichtigen wissenschaftspoliti-
schen Thema offen.
Dem Journal of Science, Humanities and Arts (josha.
org) danken wir für die Genehmigung der Übernahme 
in OdW.
I. Introduction
Patents are currently the most common mechanism to 
stimulate pharmaceutical innovation. They are conside-
red an efficient allocation mechanism and a system in 
which fewer resources are squandered.1 Patents are of 
importance for pharmaceutical companies, since inno-
vation is expensive with developing costs per new drug 
at more than 2 billion U.S. Dollars.2 In 1995, members of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) signed the agree-
ment on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) to standardize patent rights in an inter-
national context.3 The trade agreement entails strict 
patent protection laws, i.e. a market exclusivity for paten-
ted drug over a period of at least 20 years.4 One of the 
main incentives to design the TRIPS agreement was to 
create a reward mechanism for pharmaceutical compa-
nies in order to recover costs, to make profits and impor-
tantly, to promote research and development (R&D) for 
diseases that affect developing nations.5 
However, the adoption of the TRIPS agreement exa-
cerbated two problems that are persistent in the discus-
sion about essential medicines for the global poor.6
Access to medicines: First, there is a distribution prob-
lem of existing innovations. As Thomas Faunce and Hi-
toshi Nasu put it, “the moral and practical problem of 
how poor people will continue to gain affordable access 
to medicines is one of the most pressing issues currently 
confronting humanity”.7 Oftentimes, essential medicines 
are not accessible for poor patients, since pharmaceutical 
companies set high prices for drugs under the current 
patent regime.8 After the implementation of the TIRPS 
agreement, the generic industry for new drugs was effec-
tively shut down in developing countries due to the strict 
patent protection on a global scale. Thus, the accessibili-
ty of new innovations under the TRIPS regime has been 
shifted beyond the twenty-year protection of patents. 
Thomas Pogge argues that in consequence, an even hig-
her percentage of the global poor is nowadays excluded 
from drug use than during the pre-TRIPS era.9 
Lack of R&D for neglected diseases: Second, under 
high price patent regimes, in which drugs are sold under 
a monopoly10, most R&D is dedicated to diseases predo-
minant in developed nations where the purchasing pow-
er for expensive pharmaceuticals is the highest.11 Hence, 
due to a lacking market in developing countries, phar-
maceutical companies do not develop a sufficient amount 
of essential medicines that would be life-saving for type 
II and III diseases like tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS and tro-
pical diseases.12 Among other factors, this imbalance in 
global R&D finds expression in the “10/90 gap” – only 10 
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R&D, out-of-the pocket and time costs.
3  WTO (2001), Hollis (2008: 124).
4  Ravvin (2008: 110), Hollis (2008: 124). The TRIPS agreement was 
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5  Ravvin (2008), Pogge (2009: 543-546), Buchanan et al. (2011: 307-
310, 131), see Pogge (2009).
6  Pogge (2008, 2009).
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8 Pogge (2005, 2008, 2008b, 2009) argues that also poor patients 
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9  Pogge (2008: 73-76, 2009: 543-546).
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11  See Davis (1995), Hollis (2008), Pogge (2008), Pogge (2009), Ridley 
and Grabowski (2006).
12  The World Health Organization (2012:1) defines type I diseases 
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incident in poor countries. See Buchanan et al. (2011:307), see 
WHO (2006).
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20  See Sen (1999), see McDonald (2006), Pogge (2005, 2005b, 2009). 
Even libertarians like Nozick (1974: 178-182), acknowledge the li-
mits of private property in the light of human rights violations by 
saying that those in control of the remaining resources must not 
deprive people from essential goods. See Exdell (1977: 144-145), 
see Gordon (1992).
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23  Sonderholm (2010: 171). Even if a drug is available on the local 
market at cheap prices, a lack of infrastructure can lead to delive-
ry problems over the last mile.
per cent of the global R&D is devoted to diseases that ac-
count for 90 percent of the global disease burden.13 Like-
wise, there is a bias towards symptom relieving drugs 
under the current patent regime. This means that profits 
for pharmaceutical companies depend on the number of 
treatments sold – which increases with the treatment of 
symptoms – and not necessarily on the health impact on 
the global burden of disease.14 
There have been various attempts to overcome the 
outlined weaknesses of international patent regimes du-
ring the past decade. One of the most prominent propo-
sals by Thomas Pogge and Aidan Hollis is the Health Im-
pact Fund (HIF).15 The HIF is designed to address the 
essential medicines problem while preserving the cur-
rent patent regime. The reform proposal of the HIF is 
based on Pogge’s defence of a global health reform. Nota-
bly, he pursues a human rights approach to justify the ur-
gent need for alternatives to the current patent regime 
that, in his view, violates the human right to health by de-
priving the poor.16 According to article 25 of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, everyone has the right 
to a standard of living adequate for health and well-being 
which also includes medical care. Likewise, the World 
Health Organization defines the right to health as enjoy-
ment of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health, which is embedded in international and 
domestic legal systems.17 While legal obligations of gran-
ting the right to health were historically imposed on na-
tional duty-bearers, broader theories of justice have been 
evolving during the past 15 years and encompass a global 
approach to health obligations.18 For instance, Pogge gi-
ves an historical account for a duty of the affluent coun-
tries to actively improve the health situation of the global 
poor. He infers this duty from the fact that the developed 
world has been responsible for the current unjust global 
order.19 Nevertheless, the human rights approach may be 
more commonly considered a robust ethical framework 
which is rooted in the strong belief that there is a social 
value for the respect for human dignity and conceptua-
lized as an international human rights norm.20 
As a matter of stipulation with the scope of this essay, 
I will not dwell on Pogge’s human rights approach or his 
historical argument for a global health reform as philo-
sophical foundations for the HIF. Likewise, I will not re-
spond to the libertarian defence of property rights.21 In 
this essay, I will discuss the design of the HIF and prob-
lems that arise with respect to its practical implementati-
on. In this regard, I will follow the main line of argument 
in the literature on the HIF. 
After reconstructing the design of the HIF alongside 
other recent approaches to improve the health of the glo-
bal poor, I will critically scrutinize the expected effec-
tiveness of the HIF in terms of its health impact on the 
global burden of disease. I will then give a general over-
view on the practical problems that the HIF poses and 
reconstruct the main points of criticism by Jorn Sonder-
holm, Allen Buchanan et al., and Michael Selgelid.22 
Subsequently, I will discuss the last mile problem in 
more detail. The last mile problem addresses the practi-
cal problem of lacking infrastructure in low-income 
countries and constitutes a major obstacle to the accessi-
bility of medicines.23 I will build upon Sonderholm who 
reformulates the last mile problem as collective choice 
problem. However, my aim is to go beyond Sonderholm’s 
critique by embedding the last mile problem into the 
broader context of global poverty traps. More precisely, I 
will argue that a solution to the last mile problem would 
entail the access to pharmaceuticals and the access to in-
formation, education, technology and economic partici-
pation, which are crucial factors for the distribution and 
accessibility of drugs on the last mile. As a result, I will 
argue that the HIF can potentially contribute, but not 
fully solve the last mile problem and consequently, the 
access to medicines problem persists under the HIF.
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24  WTO (2003), paragraph 1,4,7; see Faunce and Nasu (2008).
25  Ravvin (2008: 115-117).
26  For example, projects by the International AIDS Vaccine Initia-
tive or the Global Alliance for Tuberculosis Drug Development 
(2007) or the “Treating 2 Million by 2005” by the World Health 
Organization to target AIDS and Malaria (WHO 2003: 4-5, 24), 
Päivänsalo (2009: 101-102).
27  Ravvin (2008:117), see Hollis (2006).
28  Hollis (2008: 125-126), see Kremer and Glennerster (2004: Ch.7), 
see Word Bank (2006). Advanced Market Commitments are 
particularly used to incentivize R&D for vaccines.
29   See Buchanan et al. (2011), WHO (2012), Hsu and Schwartz 
(2007: 26), Pogge (2008: 24), see Hollis (2007), Johnston and 
Wasunna (2007).
30  Ravvin (2008: 111-112, 115).
31  Hollis (2008: 125-126).
32  Ravvin (2008: 115-117).
33  Pogge (2005, 2008, 2009), Hollis (2008).
34  Hollis (2008: 127).
35  The health impact could be also measured in DALYs (Disability-
Adjusted Life Years), using disabilities as weight for burden of 
disease. According to Hollis (2008: 128-129), DALYs are the less 
appealing measure. However, Selgelid (2008: 138) argues that the 
DALY approach may be preferable for the HIF, since the relief-
from the burden of disease is measured.
36  See Gold et at. (2002).
37  Hollis (2008: 127).
II. The Health Impact Fund in the context of other 
approaches to improve the health situation of the  
global poor
 
States, international organizations and NGOs have made 
various attempts to improve the health situation of the 
global poor. Most notably, the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health states that trade 
agreements should be interpreted and implemented to 
protect public health and to promote access to medici-
nes.24 Push-mechanisms have historically been the pri-
mary ways to promote R&D for socially desirable but 
unprofitable medicines.25 Push-mechanisms reduce the 
costs of R&D for researchers by providing funding up 
front. Governments and other funding bodies usually 
provide resources for research through grants. More 
recently, other push-strategies have been emerging like 
Public Private Partnerships and international health pro-
grams.26 In contrast to pushmechanisms, pull-mecha-
nisms give incentives to profit-seeking innovators to 
develop pharmaceuticals that are aligned to the social 
needs.27 For instance, Advances Market Commitments 
are committed to reward payments for medicines that 
meet certain criteria.28 
However, there are several flaws related to these cur-
rent attempts to improve R&D for neglected diseases. 
Push-mechanisms, for instance, support publicly funded 
projects that often lead to unsuccessful R&D. Likewise, 
funding bodies may not be the most efficient agents to 
accurately determine successful projects.29 Furthermore, 
push-mechanisms eventually lead to drugs that are sold 
at monopoly prices, since late-stage R&D is mostly fun-
ded by private companies.30 In turn, Hollis points out 
that Advanced Market Commitments are actually effici-
ent mechanisms because private companies bear the full 
costs of R&D. However, at the same time, they exhibit a 
too narrow scope for product development.31 Hence, 
current push- and pull-mechanisms, much the same as 
the TRIPS patent system, do not sustainably solve the 
two aspects of the essential medicines problem: the sub-
optimal access to life-saving drugs due to monopoly pri-
cing and the limited R&D resources for drugs that would 
be of benefit to the global poor.32 
The reform proposal by Hollis and Pogge is a pull me-
chanism that addresses both aspects of the essential me-
dicines problem. The HIF offers a second patent option 
alongside the current international patent regime.33 Un-
der the proposed HIF, pharmaceutical companies that 
bring new drugs to market have the option to either set 
monopoly prices under patents or to register new medi-
cines with the HIF. The company could patent a HIF-re-
gistered drug in any country, but would be obliged to sell 
it everywhere during the reward period of 10 years at a 
determined price, ideally at production costs, and to of-
fer a free license of the relevant technology to manufac-
ture the drug after the reward period.34 Reward pay-
ments would have to match the expected profit the firm 
would make by setting monopoly prices. Furthermore, 
reward payments would be based on the global health 
impact of the product, which could be assessed by quan-
titative methods to measure the reduction in the global 
burden of disease like Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QA-
LYs),35 a standardized measure to assess health interven-
tions.36 Hollis proposes two options to determine the 
amount of money that would be paid to the innovator. 
Either the price per incremental QALY would be fixed 
which would leave the budget of the fund indeterminate, 
or a total amount of funding for all innovators would be 
fixed in advance leaving the reward payment per QALY 
variable.37 Moreover, Hollis’ and Pogge’s reform proposal 
aims to provide a just allocation mechanism of costs to 
finance the HIF. Developed nations should bear most of 
the costs needed to build and maintain the HIF. 
According to Pogge, the HIF could be built if develo-
ped nations spent around 70 billion U.S. Dollars annu-
ally which would make up only 0.27 per cent of the ag-
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38  Pogge (2005: 192). In turn, Hollis (2008: 127) suggests a minimal 
commitment funding of 2 billion to 10 billion U.S. Dollars a year 
that would incentivize drug development and commercialization.
39  Through lower prices, a bigger quantity of medicines could be 
covered by the health care system and patients would have to 
spend less money on medicines (Pogge 2005: 192-193).
40  Pogge (2005: 193-194).
41  Pogge (2009: 548-550).
42  Hollis (2008: 126-127).
43  Pogge (2009: 549-550).
44  Hollis (2008: 128), Ravvin (2008: 121), Faunce and Nasu (2008: 
150).
45  Hollis and Pogge (2008: 31).
46  Buchanan et al. (2008: 325-326).
47  Faunce and Nasu (2008: 150), Sonderholm (2010: 173).
48  Buchanan et al. (2008: 326).
49  Selgelid (2008: 138).
50  Selgelid (2008: 139-151), see Sonderholm (2010: 171-173).
51  Selgelid (2008: 138, 143).
gregate gross national income.38 Hollis and Pogge consi-
der the increased spending by the affluent countries as 
realistic option for prudential reasons: First, prices for 
pharmaceuticals would also be considerably lower in de-
veloped countries.39 Second, Pogge states that a “free 
ride” for developing countries on pharmaceutical re-
search could show good-will of the affluent countries 
and enable the developing world to respond more effec-
tively to publichealth problems.40 According to Pogge, 
the HIF registration system would be superior to the 
current status quo because it consists of an additional pa-
tent system that rewards R&D based on the health im-
pact of new drugs. The health impact promises to be 
high when a new drug targets a large number of diseases 
like malaria, AIDS/HIV, tuberculosis and other tropical 
diseases that primarily affect the developing world. Thus, 
the HIF would incentivize research for diseases that cur-
rently impose a high burden across the world and for 
which there are only few treatment alternatives availab-
le.41 Furthermore, the HIF would be more efficient than 
common push-mechanisms because only successful in-
novation would be rewarded.42 Likewise, the reward sys-
tem correspondent to the health impact would generate 
incentives to sell the drug cheaply in order to reach more 
patients, and to encourage other companies to copy and 
sell the drug. This would substantially contribute to im-
prove the access to medicine problem for the global 
poor.43 
III. General critique and limits to the practical  
implementation of the HIF
 
Several critiques of Hollis’ and Pogge’s reform proposal 
address the practical issues of its implementation. Faunce 
and Nasu, Ravvin and Hollis himself argue that the HIF 
would be prone to firms that exaggerate the health 
impact of new drugs under the HIF.44 Hence, useful 
resources that could be spent on R&D, the administrati-
on of the HIF and the assessment of the health impact 
would have to be spent on a control system to fight cor-
ruption.45 Furthermore, Buchanan et al. criticize two 
implicit assumptions of the HIF model which they call 
funding and reliability assumption. First, to address the 
funding assumption, Buchanan et al. give historical evi-
dence that most publicized funding commitments in the 
affluent world have not been met in practice. Thus, phar-
maceutical companies would rely less on the payment 
commitment by the HIF than on the current patent sys-
tem. Also, providing public funding to private compa-
nies is politically unpopular.46 In the same line, Faunce 
and Nasu as well as Sonderholm question the Pogge’s 
suggestion that affluent countries would bear an annual 
price tag of 70 billion U.S. Dollars when it remains unc-
lear whether the developed world benefits from the HIF 
or not.47 Second, regarding the reliability assumption, 
companies would have to rely on fair rewards that cover 
R&D expenses and assure equal profits compared to the 
ordinary patent registration. According to Buchanan et 
al., it remains difficult to implement reliable measure-
ments for the health impact of drugs on the global bur-
den of disease, in particular when diseases are multi-fac-
torial or treated with several drugs.48 Selgelid similarly 
points out that despite the progress in the global disease 
burden (GDB) research, measurement systems like tho-
se ones using QALYs or DALYs are weakest in develo-
ping countries where they would be needed most.49 
Thus, appropriate methods of data collection for the 
establishment of the HIF do not exist. Also, Selgelid sys-
tematically shows the problems that arise when the dec-
line in GDB occurs due to effects caused by more than 
one drug. Based on counterfactual examples, he demons-
trates that the actual effect of a drug is indefinable when 
there are synergistic or additive effects of a second 
drug.50 He concludes that the evaluation of the real effect 
of a drug would require a huge amount of data collection 
and analysis in practice. Hence, an effective implementa-
tion of the HIF remains highly challenging and possibly 
unrealistic.51 
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52  UNAIDS (2013: 4). However, the provision of treatment in the 
area has been substantially increased during the last decade. As 
stated in a former WHO report (2005: 13), only 11 percent of the 
sub-Saharan African HIV patients received antiretroviral therapy 
in 2005.
53  Sonderholm (2010: 170), see Attaran and Gillespie-White (2001).
54  Sonderholm (2010: 170-171) argues against Pogge (2005: 184) 
who uses the global AIDS crisis in Africa as vital example for the 
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R&D costs of pharmaceutical companies.
55  Hollis and Pogge (2008: 75).
56  Hollis and Pogge (2008, Ch. 7).
57  Hollis and Pogge (2008: 75-77).
58  Pogge (2009: 549-550), Hollis and Pogge (2010).
59  Sonderholm (2010: 171).
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goods or services. See Cornes and Sandler (1996).
61  Hollis and Pogge (2008: Ch. 7).
IV. An assessment of the HIF’s ability to solve the 
access to medicine problem in the light of poverty 
traps 
So far, the presented critiques mainly address the imple-
mentation of the HIF. However, I will now focus in more 
detail on another practical problem – the “last mile pro-
blem” – that concerns access to pharmaceuticals. Many 
people are still excluded from drug use, although phar-
maceuticals could be cheaply available. A recent 
UNAIDS report states that to this day only about 41 per 
cent of sub-Saharan African HIV/AIDS patients receive 
antiretroviral drugs.52 However, Sonderholm argues that 
antiretroviral HIV drugs are not commonly patented in 
African countries.53 Thus, the current TRIPS system 
cannot be made fully responsible for the exclusion of 
patients from essential drugs in the global AIDS crisis. 
According to Sonderholm, the lack of physicians, clinics, 
and infrastructure to administer the antiretroviral thera-
py and to screen people are the main causes for the AIDS 
epidemic and not the price policies of pharmaceuticals.54 
This lack of infrastructure for the final distribution of 
drugs is known as the last mile problem. To reduce the 
global burden of disease effectively, drugs must be deli-
vered to patients over ‘the last mile’. 
Hollis and Pogge argue that shortcomings in the 
health sector would adversely affect the spread of HIF-
registered drugs. Hence, the authors believe that phar-
maceutical companies that register drugs under the HIF 
would have strong incentives to sustainably pursue stra-
tegies to improve the health impact of new drugs on the 
GDB in order to increase the reward payments.55 Firms 
would tackle the last mile problem by improving factors 
that prevent the effective acquisition of drugs.56 Such im-
provements would be efforts to determine how informa-
tion could be best communicated to the public, how 
health care education could be improved, and to identify 
strategies to encourage health care providers in the pub-
lic and private sector to develop strategies for drug dis-
pensers, health care workers and drug sellers.57 Further-
more, Pogge argues that HIF registrants, perhaps in col-
laboration with international agencies or NGOs, would 
be in a more potent position than poor countries to over-
come shortcomings on the last mile.58 Therefore, Hollis 
and Pogge consider the HIF as a realistic chance to im-
prove the last mile problem. 
However, as Sonderholm puts it, there is little hope 
that the HIF would sustainably solve the last mile prob-
lem. He argues that despite strong incentives to improve 
the access to medicines under the HIF, there would be a 
collective choice problem. 
„So, imagine that company A has a product in country x 
and that company B also has a product in this country 
and that its product has a significantly higher potential 
for health improvement that the product of company A. 
Imagine also that company A has another product in 
another country that has a huge potential for health im-
provement and that company B has no other product 
than the one it has in x. [...] In this scenario, company A 
has very little financial incentive for contributing to 
country x.”59 
In this outlined hypothetical case, a collective choice 
problem of lacking incentives to improve the health inf-
rastructure occurs. Furthermore, assuming that there is 
usually more than one company that produces medici-
nes with a potential health impact, firms would specula-
te to free-ride on the efforts made by other companies. 
This would eventually lead to a suboptimal provision of 
health infrastructure.60 
Building upon Sonderholm’s critique, I will introduce 
the concept of poverty traps and apply it to the last mile 
problem in order to provide a different, more fundamen-
tal critique of the HIF’s ability to effectively solve the ac-
cess to medicines problem. Similarly to Sonderholm, I 
do not believe that Hollis’ and Pogge’s argument – that 
firms would have the capacity to substantially contribute 
to the last mile problem61 – is very compelling. However, 
I believe that there are reasons other than the collective 
choice problem Sonderholm identifies. To show this, I 
will analyze the last mile problem in the context of global 
poverty traps. 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) estab-
lished in 2000 envisaged the affluent countries mobili-
zing resources to reduce poverty by increasing develo-
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65  Stuckler et al. (2010: 1).
66  Ooms et al. (2010: 1-2).
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ping assistance from 0.25% of the gross domestic product 
in 2003 to 0.54% in 2015 which amounts to 120 billion 
U.S. Dollars annually.62 The goal was already exceeded 
by 2007 when more than 120 billion U.S. Dollars were 
spent, from which 22 billion U.S. Dollars were going to 
health programs.63 
However, the United Nations, that set the MDGs, ex-
pected a much greater impact on poverty which was not 
overcome by the raising and spending of enormous 
funds. Many very poor countries are still unable to reach 
the outlined goals. For instance, according to estimates 
in 2010 and 2012, 896 million people were living on less 
than two Dollars a day. Child and maternal mortality are 
still above the target rate.64 David Stuckler et al. show 
that the unequal progress in achieving the health MDGs 
in low-income countries is significantly related to the 
burden of type I and type II diseases like HIV/AIDS and 
other communicable diseases.65 
Gorik Ooms et al. explain that poverty traps are the 
major causes for the fact that the MDGs have not been 
met as expected. Poverty traps, according to Ooms et al., 
are vicious cycles of insufficient capital in which poor 
countries are unable to build up infrastructure and busi-
ness, and to sustain education. This lack of sustainable 
infrastructure entails a lack of services that would be 
needed for health, education, or other basic infrastruc-
ture which, in turn, would be required to maintain the 
health of workers that would produce capital and so 
on.66 Poverty traps imply a long-term growth failure of 
very poor countries and an increasing divergence in the 
global economy. Also, institutional failures prevent 
countries from escaping this viscous cycle.67 Furthermo-
re, global centres of economic growth and prosperity like 
the Western world, China, Russia, Brazil, and South Af-
rica, attract capital and human resources to “bend the 
rules to their advantage”, but the return of capital does 
not go back to poor countries.68 In addition to that, capi-
tal accumulation in poor countries can easily be over-
whelmed by global price fluctuations, for instance, of 
commodities low-income countries largely depend on. 
Also, low-income countries frequently lack an insurance 
system that would be needed to develop comparative 
economic advantages.69 
As Ooms et al. suggest, poor countries cannot impro-
ve their overall health situation due to the poverty traps 
they are caught in. In the following, I will show that this 
corresponds to the – what Sonderholm, Hollis and Pog-
ge call – last mile problem. The failure to achieve the 
MDGs reveals the genuine importance of poverty traps 
and the substantial difficulties on the last mile, since 
countries remain in poverty despite the provision of 
enormous funding. Sustainable networks of services, 
staff and traffic systems that would be needed to effici-
ently solve the last mile problem seem to be deeply ent-
angled with more far-reaching global economic structu-
res. There are longstanding shortcomings like the lack of 
electricity, knowledge and information about diseases, as 
well as corruption which international agencies, NGOs 
and states have been addressing over several decades. 
Given the entanglement of the last mile problem with 
global economic structures and local shortcomings, I 
argue that the HIF is not unable to solve the last mile 
problem just because of the collective choice problem 
Sonderholm introduces. Even if the presented collective 
choice problem could be solved, a sustainable interventi-
on needed to drag a country out of a poverty trap would 
be too far-reaching in view of the local and global di-
mension of the trap. Despite the affluence of the phar-
maceutical industry, it would be unlikely to expect priva-
te firms to have the necessary resources to attain success. 
This seems especially compelling when considering Hol-
lis and Pogge’s assumption that the resources needed to 
solve the last mile problem could almost exclusively be 
raised by the pharmaceutical industry. Then, the authors 
would have to claim that firms would maximize profits 
with the HIF while and precisely because they are freeing 
countries from poverty traps. This claim appears to sub-
stantially underrate the structural constitution of the last 
mile problem. 
To actually tackle the access to medicines problem ef-
fectively, I suggest that the problem has to be viewed in a 
wider context of access to health-related information, 
knowledge, and education.70 These factors are of impor-
tance to the distribution of drugs, just as affordable pri-
ces. According to Thana Campos, only a fundamental in-
stitutional health reform could solve the current global 
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health dilemma.71 For instance, the Millennium Deve-
lopment Goals advocate a more systematic approach by 
identifying, for instance, pharmaceutical companies and 
the whole private sector as responsible actors to provide 
access to medicines and new technologies, such as infor-
mation and communication technologies.72 
V. Conclusion
The HIF is comprehensive in its scope and offers in its 
theoretical foundation a plausible mechanism to solve 
the health problems of the global poor. It is a serious att-
empt to tackle the global imbalance in R&D and to set 
long-term incentives for the development of cheap drugs 
with a global health impact. Thus, the HIF is a valuable 
reform proposal to address the problem of patentable 
drugs and the problem of extreme deprivation through 
monopoly prices. Also, the HIF is in line with a strong 
and justifiable ethical framework based on a human 
rights approach. 
The critiques of the practical implementation I dis-
cussed suggest that more research on issues of practicali-
ty needs to be done before a final verdict on the HIF can 
be passed. However, having depicted the complex struc-
tures of poverty traps, the analysis of the last mile prob-
lem suggests that however positive this verdict turns out 
to be, the HIF’ ability to solely improve the last mile pro-
blem is limited. In this regard, Hollis and Pogge may ove-
restimate the potential strength of the HIF. Thus, I advo-
cate an approach in which the HIF would be introduced 
as a mechanism alongside other structural reforms on a 
global and local level to overcome poverty traps and the 
access to medicines problem.
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